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Abstract
The Consul General in Okinawa was in a decidedly unique, if not trying, position during the
period of U. S. administration of the Ryukyu Islands, and particularly during the 1950s. As the
local State Department representative, he was responsible for, among other duties, reporting
on the local political scene as well as on the frictions that developed between the local popula-
tion and the U. S. military, which was charged with the administration of the islands. Despite
their being at the forefront of this clash or "conflict" in military/strategic requirements and
political/diplomatic considerations in America's policy toward Okinawa, there are n｡ studies
on this important position and the persons-their backgrounds, views, policy influence, etc.-
filling it. This paper, based on recently declassified U. S. documents and interviews conducted
with the former consuls general, attempts to shed light on the demanding activities of the con-
sul general and policy reconmendations made at the time to give a fuller understanding of
Okinawa in the postwar U. S.-Japan relationship.
Keywo rds : Okinawa, Consul General, U. S. military, base problems, Okinawa Problem
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Despite the so-called "Okinawa Problem" being a major issue in postwar U. S.-Japan
relations and the focus of frequent news reports, surprisingly little systematic research
exists to date on this important subject.1' In the few studies available, inadequate
attention has been given to the people-their backgrounds, views, influence, etc.
involved in policy-making with regard to Okinawa. This is particularly true for the U. S.
Consuls General, despite their being at the forefront-literally-of what this writer has
called elsewhere the clash or "conflict" in military/strategic requirements and political/
diplomatic considerations in America's policy toward Okinawa.2
The Consul General in Okinawa during the period of U. S. administration of the
Ryukyu Islands (1952-1972) was in a decidedly unique, if not trying, position.3'Although
Japan possessed "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands, the United States (on
behalf of the Allies) was given "the right to exercise all and any powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction." Because of this complex and eventually
untenable situation, a =reversion movement" developed in Okinawa, the main island of
the Ryukyus, greatly affecting the local political dynamics and administration of the
islands and complicating the fragile U. S.-Japan relationship. The Consul General, as the
local State Department representative, was responsible for, among other duties, report-
ing on the local political scene as well as on the frictions that developed between the
local population and the U. S. military, which was charged with the administration of
the islands (but was doing a poor job).4) Because the Consul General had commumca-
tion lines with Washington independent of those of the Army, the reports that emerged
1) An earlier version of this article was presented at the 34"1 Annual Meeting of the Oral History Association,
･At the Crossroads: Transforming Community Locally and Globally," held from October ll-15, 2000 m
Durham. North Carolina. The author would like to thank, in addition to the interviewees, others who assisted
in this study such as Dr. Higa Mikio, who worked for the U. S. Consulate in the 1950s, and Nakamoto
Kazuhiko. He is grateful to the Eisenhower International Affairs Institute for support in this research.
2) See Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U. S.-Japan
Relations, 1945-1952 (New York: Routledge-Garland, 2001).
3) The United States occupied Okinawa from 1945 to 1952, and then administered the islands from 1952 to 1972
as per Article 3 0f the Treaty of Peace with Japan (signed on September 8, 1951).
4) Several articles critical of the military's administration of the islands can be found from the 1950s, suggesting
the atmosphere at the time. Four examples include: Otis W. Bell,"Play Fair with the Okinawans !" Christian
century, Vol.7, No.2 (1954), p.32; Helen Mears, 〃Okinawa: Orphan of Conquest," Nation, No.183
(November 3, 1956), pp. 15-18; Robert Trumbull, "Okinawa: `Sometimes Painful'Lesson for Us," New York
Times Mi喝冴蝣zine, Vol. 40, No. 16 (April 7, 1957), p. 29; Barton M. Biggs, "The Outraged Okinawans," Ha坤ers
, Vol. 55, No. 12 (December 1958), pp. 56-60.
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provide a rich and contrasting view (vis一丘-vis the image portrayed by the military
authorities) of Okinawa in the 1950s and the problems in U. S. policy toward Okinawa
at the time. Importantly, these reports also provided the State Department, thousands of
miles away in Washington, D. C, with invaluable information that was introduced into
policy discussions and decisions, often serving, the author suggests, as voice of modera-
tion in America's administration of Okinawa.
After discussing the creation and functions of the Consulate General and the
individuals who were appointed Consul General from 1952 to 1960, I identify how the
Consul General, as the State Department representative, perceived events at the time
and how (or to what degree) he sought, and was able, to influence policy.
This article is based not only on declassified U. S. diplomatic documents, journalistic
reports, and Okinawan accounts, but importantly also includes the contents of
interviews conducted with the four Consuls General-Thomas H. Murfin, John M.
Steeves, Olcott H. Deming, and Byron E. Blankinship-two of whom have since passed
away.5'It is not meant to be a complete study-only a book could fully examine the
complexities of the era, the demanding activities of the Consuls General, and policies
pursued. Instead, it is hoped that by introducing, however briefly, the until-now
unexammed role of the Consul General, and the issues he faced, a fuller understanding
of Okinawa in the postwar U. S.-Japan relationship can emerge.
The U. S. Consulate in Okinawa
In September 1951, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed in San Francisco
bringing a formal end to the state of war between Japan and也e Allies. As is mentioned
above, while Article 3 0f the treaty gave the United States administrative powers over
the islands, this was not meant to be a permanent arrangement.6'Indeed, because chief
negotiator John Foster Dulles created a "window of opportunity" by allowing Japan to
5) Technically speaking, Murfin's title was not "Consul General," but "Vice Consul." The remaining three were
of Consul General rank. Since the interviews were first conducted, Steeves passed away on October 1, 1998 at
the age of 93, and Murfin died on January 22, 2000, after a long battle with leukemia. The interviews con-
ducted with the above Consuls General form the first stage of an ongoing (and self-funded) Oral History
project recording their role in Postwar Okinawa through today, some仇ing which surprisingly has not been
done to date on either the U. S. or Okinawa/Japanese side. I am hoping to eventually donate the transcripts
of the interviews with all of the surviving Consuls General to the newly constructed Okinawa Prefectural
Archives, as well as to possibly place them on-line as well in order for as many researchers as possible to
have access to them.
6) Eldridge, op. tit, particularly chapters 7 and 8.
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retain sovereignty, discussions over血e islands'disposition continued within the U. S.
government suggesting that they could be returned by也e time (or at least shortly
after) the peace treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952. To the U. S. military however,
Okinawa was strategically vital. Moreover, there were emotional attachments to the
island following the great losses of American soldiers in taking Okinawa in one of the
bloodiest battles of the Pacific War and thus the military strongly resisted its being
returned to Japan. Indeed, for many years, military officials had actually called for per-
manent U. S. control over the islands and even their annexation. Needless to say, the
Japanese government feared precisely this and desired that the islands would be
returned at the time the peace treaty went into effect or as soon as international con-
ditions permitted. Intense discussions between State and Defense representatives con-
tinued until April 28, 1952 (the- day the occupation of Japan officially ended) ; however
State was not able to overcome the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Discussions
would continue in the summer and fall, but without success. It would take 20 years
before the islands were finally returned in 1972.)
With Okinawa's fate undetermined, before the formal occupation of Japan ended, a
"Consular Unit" was established in Okinawa in January 1952 to perform consular
services for the more than　20,000　American servicemen and their dependents in
Okinawa. The Consular Unit was initially under the Office of the United States Political
Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) , and would shortly
become a part of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo operations when the embassy reopened.
The title "Consular Unit" is rather unique. Simply stated, it is a name for U. S. repre-
sentation abroad, but in this particular instance, it seems to have been so titled to sat-
isfy the military.7'In other words, U. S. military authorities, many who continued to
argue that Okinawa should be permanently separated from Japan, believed　也at
designating the State Department's representation in Okinawa a "consulate" would sig-
nify that Okinawa was indeed a part of a foreign country (Japan) and would not
become a territory of the United States (which is what many in the military desired).8)
7) The office was also known as the POLAD office at this time more out of habit it seems than of any actual
organizational reason, but gradually the use of consular unit and consul general became more common. How
and why this transition in name took place is not clear from the available records.
Interestingly, a similar debate existed on the Japanese side in which questions emerged as to whether it was
appropriate for the Foreign Ministry, which deals with foreign relations, to establish a liaison office in
Okinawa (in the summer of 1952) , because Japan had "residual sovereignty" over the islands. Eventually, the
liaison office was placed under the control of the Prime Minister's Office (Sorifu). See Ishii Michinori,
"Nanpo Renraku Jimukyoku Secchi ni Itatta Keii to Secchigo no Gyomu ni Tsuite (On the Background to
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The military, simply put, was apprehensive of the State Department, as well as its argu-
merit that Okinawa was a part of Japan and should be returned to Japan.
It was in the middle of也is Hsuspicious environment" that the first consul, Thomas H.
Murfin, was sent to Okinawa, staying there for more than two years, until mid-1954.
Symbolic of the military's distrust of the State Department, and disregard of its
representative, 36-year-old Murfin was initially ignored and not invited to functions
where his presence was probably necessary, and it took many mon血s for him to gain
the grudging acceptance of the military.9'It is doubtful that many in the State Depart-
ment therefore were envious of Murfin's job. The same was probably true for his
successor, John M. Steeves. However, Steeves, ten years senior and more trusted by the
military, expanded the Consul General's advisory functions and was able to increase
respect among the military for his office.
Steeves'successor, Olcott H. Deming, further increased the advisory functions of the
Consul General, but was distressed that the first High Commissioner (Lieutenant Gen-
eral James E. Moore) with whom he worked (and who was unpopular among the local
residents) did not seek more to use that advice, which he obviously could have
used.10'The second High Commissioner (Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth) went further to ben-
efit from that advice, but it was on an ad hoc basis.ll) Deming and State Department
officials, worried about local reactions to the military's handling of events, sought to
institutionalize the advice of the consul general by creating a political adviser's post, or
POLAD.12) They eventually succeeded and on January 1, 1960, Byron E. Blankinship
became POLAD, leaving his position as Consul General, which he became in August
1959 after Deming left for the United States.13)
the Establishment of the Southern Areas Liaison Office and the Functions of the Office After Its Establish-
ment) ," Nanpo Renraku jiho (Report of the Southern Areas Liaison Office) , Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 1953) , p. 6.
9) Interview wi也Mrs. Thomas H. Murfin, July 1, 2000, Seattle, Washington.
10) Moore, who had been Deputy Governor since March 5, 1955, served as the first High Commissioner from July
4, 1957 to May 1, 1958.
ll) Booth, who was much more popular than Moore among the local residents and viewed as･ more liberal,
served from May 1, 1958 until February 1961. Booth's successor, Lt. General Paul M. Caraway (who served
from February 16, 1961 until August 1964), on the other hand, was very unpopular and tried to undo
Kennedy's ``New Okinawa Policy" set forth in March 1962. The position of HiCom continued until Okinawa
was returned in 1972.
12) For an excellent study of the POLAD institution, see Jon Lippitt Boyes, "The Political Adviser (POLAD):
The Role of the Diplomatic Adviser to Selected United States and North Atlantic Alliance Military C0m-
manders," (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Delaware, 1971).
13) Some of the High Commissioners sought to significantly use their POLADs, others less so. Blankinship con-
tinued in his post as POLAD until late August 1961. He was succeeded by Gerald Warner, a long-time
observer of Okinawa and Japanese affairs, and brother-in-law of U. Alexis Johnson, a high-ranking State
Department official (and later U. S. Ambassador to Japan), who helped move forward discussions on the.
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While not the subject of this article, the role of POLAD to the High Commissioner
continued until Okinawa was returned in 1972. During that time, the Consul General in
Okinawa continued his responsibilities for consular affairs and as the State Department
representative in Okinawa, varying between those with specialty in consular duties and
those with expertise in political-economic matters.14' A brief discussion of the
backgrounds and careers of each of the consuls general follows.
The U. S. Consuls General in Okinawa, 1952-1960
A) Thomas H. Murfin (1952-1954)
Murfm, the first U.S. Consul to Okinawa, was born in Sunnyside, Washington on July
7, 1915　and received his degree in Business Administration at the University of
Washington at Seattle in 1938. Among other jobs in pre-World War II America, such as
with the Washington State Progress Committee and the Department of Labor, Murfin
also worked as an editor for a weekly newspaper, a company run by his publisher-
father, Arthur.15'
When World War II broke out, Murfin joined the Navy as a Lieutenant, later study-
ing Japanese, in which he had had a childhood interest, at the Boulder, Colorado
Japanese language school operated by the Navy.16'Later serving in the Pacific, he was
on hand during the Battle of Okinawa in April 1945. From April 3, two days after fight-
ing started, Murfm began serving in the Naval Military Government, assisting
Okinawan civilians displaced by the bombing and later that summer at the relocation
camps in the north of the island. Murfin continued his work with the Naval Military
Government until April 21, 1946, when he returned to the United States. During that
time, he earned a reputation for diligence in his work, and kindness and concern for the
reversion of Okinawa during the 1966-1969 period
14) W. Garland Richardson succeeded Blankinship as Consul General in June 1960. Richardson's successor,
Richard W. Finch (1962-1965), was of Consul rank. The position continued to be filled by those of Consul
rank until 1972, when it became the Consulate General again, and headed up by Consul General Richard W.
Petree.
15) State Department物・hie Register, 1955; Author's interview with Thomas H. Murfin (hereafter Murfin
interview) , January 7, 1999, Seattle, Washington: "Thomas Murfin: Ground-level Diplomat (Obituary) ," Seattle
Times, January 29, 2000. (Through the author's introduction, Murfin's personal papers have been donated to
the Okinawa Prefecture! Archives.)
16) Murfin interview; "Thomas Murfin: Ground-level Diplomat (Obituary) ,"珍. cit. The Japanese Language
program at Boulder produced many of the postwar Japan experts in literature, academia, military, and
diplomacy, including Richard B. Finn and Marshall Green.
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local inhabitants.1
In June 1947, having successfully passed the Foreign Service Exam, Murfin was
appointed to the diplomatic service and in October he was sent to Tokyo to work in the
Political Adviser's office of Supreme Commander of仇e Allied Powers, General Douglas
MacArthur.18'In May 1949, Murfin was appointed vice consul at Yokohama, some 30
miles south of Tokyo, which, along with Kobe in Western Japan, was the only U. S.
Consulate office in occupied Japan at the time.19) During this time, Murfin went to
Okinawa twice to perform consular duties.20)
In January 1952. the Consular Unit in Okinawa was established and Murfin and his
wife, Julie, and children moved to Naha that month. Murfin had "a strong feeling
toward Okinawa and welcomed the opportunity to go back."21' They would remain
there until June 24, 1954, at which time they returned to Washington so that he could
assume duties at the department in October. There, Murfin was involved in Okinawa
and Japan-related affairs, but only briefly.22)
B) JohnM. Steeves (1954 1956)
Born in North Dakota on May 6, 1905, Steeves, like Murfin, also attended school in
Washington, after having spent most of his childhood in Alberta, Canada.23' Steeves
graduated from Walla Walla College, a Seventh Day Adventist school, with a major in
17) W. Gordon Ross, Why to...Okinawa? (North Quincy, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1971), 52-55.
Murfin was later thanked for his services during this desperate time by the villagers. See Okinawa Times,
May 4, 1967. Murfin's dedication to helping displaced persons would continue after his retirement in 1973,
when he assisted refugees from China and Southeast Asia. See "Thomas Murfin: Ground-level Diplomat
′(Obituary)."
18) Interestingly, a colleague of Murfin's at POLAD, Neal H. Lawrence, who arrived in Tokyo at the same time,
also had a very similar experience, having served in Okinawa in the military government and later joining
the Foreign Service. Interview with Neal William Henry Lawrence, December 13, 1997, Shinagawa-ku,
Tokyo; also see Neal H. Lawrence, "Okinawa: Battle and Regeneration," Transactions of the Asiatic Socieかof
Japan, Fourth Series, Volume 12 (1997) , pp. 1-17.
19) Consulates were later opened in 1950 in Sapporo, Nagoya, Fukuoka, and a smaller office was opened within
the Diplomatic Section of SCAP headquarters. An office in Kobe had already been established (reopened) in
1947.
20) Letter from Thomas H. Murfin to author, September 28, 1998.
21) Murfin interview. He added, half-laughingly, that he "didn't think anyone had a strong desire to go."
22) Murfin did eventually return to Japan as Consul General (Tokyo) in 1962, continuing until early 1970. In 1984,
as part of a Christian organization-sponsored tour, he also visited Okinawa.
23) John M. Steeves, Safir (Ambassador) , (Hershey, PA: private publisher, 1991) , pp.ト37. In addition to his self-
published memoirs, Steeves conducted an Oral History interview wi蝕the John F. Kennedy Library on Sep-
tember 5, 1969 and a second one on March 27, 1991 with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, pre-
served at the Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, and sponsored by the Association for Diplomatic
Studies. I am indebted to Charles Stewart Kennedy, director of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, for
introducing me to Steeves, and for his encouragement in this project.
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Organic Chemistry in 1927. That same year, he went to India as a missionary, later serv-
ing as a principal in the school system there.24'He eventually assumed responsibility for
all of the educational work in India, Burma, and Ceylon.
Steeves'long association with South Asia came in especially handy when World War
II broke out. Feeling the call of duty, Steeves decided to return to the United States in
order to receive his commission-in effect breaking from the pacifist-oriented mission
work to which he had belonged. He was subsequently assigned to the Psychological
Warfare Unit of the Office of War Information in India in 1943 where he remained until
the spring of 1945. In late August 1945, Steeves was assigned to the State Department as
"Outpost Manager for the Far East," followed by three years in the Near East and
Africa Division. In May 1948, as part of the Manpower Act established by Congress in
1946, Steeves entered the Foreign Service. In August of that year, Steeves was sent to
New Delhi, India, as Counselor for Public Affairs. In August of 1950, Steeves was
detailed to the National War College, which had been set up in 1946 and Hconceived as
the senior of the various mid-career educational establishments of the armed services.'1
Upon graduation from the program in the spring of 1951, Steeves went to Tokyo that
June as First Secretary and Counselor, beginning his first real contact with Japan
(although he had passed through Japan on his way to and from India). During this time,
he often received Murfin's dispatches from Okinawa, drawing up reports for
Washington based on them, and was thus very much acquainted with events there.
Steeves'stay in Tokyo was interrupted in the summer of 1953 when he was asked to
assume the position of Acting Ambassador in Djakarta, Indonesia, which, at the time
was "a mess," as Steeves recalled later.25) After a home leave in late 1954 and early
1955, Steeves was reassigned to Japan, where he became Consul General in Okinawa,
arriving there in the spring of 1955. He would continue as Consul General until early
1957, upon which time he became POLAD to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific,
Admiral Felix Stump, in Honolulu. In this capacity, he continued to be deeply involved
in Okinawa and Japan-related affairs, particularly in light of the fact that the Ryukyus
Command would come directly under Admiral Stump's headquarters in the reorganiza-
tion that took place in 1957. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs from 1959 to 1961, he would also be in a critical position to observe and
24) Steeves'years in India are covered in detail in Chapter 4 of his memoirs.
25) Steeves, op. cit, p. 115.
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comment on Okinawan affairs.
O Olcott H. Deming (1957-1959)
Deming, Steeves'successor, also had experience in Tokyo before his appointment as
Consul General in Okinawa. While he would go on to have a distinguished career and
serve as Ambassador to Uganda and Chairman of the United Nations Committee on
Decolonization, Deming curiously (and perhaps unfortunately) was not placed in a
position relating to Okinawa affairs upon his departure from Naha in 1959, despite his
reporting having probably been among the best of the Consuls General this author has
examined.26'In an interesting footnote to history, Deming's son, Rust M. Deming, served
as DCM, and then Charge d'Affaires, during and following the recent problems in
Okinawa, followed by a couple of years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asia and Pacific Affairs. Because of his father's work, the younger Deming had spent
his summers in Okinawa, and was thus quite familiar with the history of the problem
there.
The senior Deming was born in Westchester, New York, on February 28, 1909, and
was raised in Connecticut.271 He graduated from Rollins College in Florida in 1935
after spending a summer in Europe following his junior year. From 1935 to 1937, Deming
did graduate work at the University of Tennessee, while working at the Tennessee
Valley Authority as a research assistant. Subsequently, Deming returned to Connecticut
where he worked as an instructor in Spanish, French, and English in Fairfield, and led
student groups to prewar and wartime Europe in 1938, 1939, and 1940 as part of the
Experiment in International Living program. In the summer of 1941, Deming joined the
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller,
working on scientific and educational cooperation with Latin America. In 1943, he was
recruited by the State Department to serve in its Latin American Affairs Bureau and
subsequently began working for the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cul-
tural Cooperation.
In 1947, as part of the same Manpower Act from which Steeves benefited, Deming
joined the Foreign Service, receiving his appointment in仇e spring of 1948. That
26) In addition to our interview, Deming conducted a 43-page oral history with the Foreign Affairs Oral History
Program at Georgetown University on April 20-21, 1988 (hereafter Deming Interview, FAOHP).
27) State Department Biographic Register, 1951; Deming Interview, FAOHP.
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summer, he was sent to Bangkok, Thailand as First Secretary and Public Affairs
Officer. In 1951, Deming went to the Embassy in Tokyo as Deputy Public Affairs
Officer, observing first-hand Japan's return to也e community of nations following the
end of the Allied occupation in 1952. In 1953, Deming left to join the State Department's
Bureau of United Nations Affairs, where he worked for four years. In early 1957,
"without much prior notice or expectation," Deming was designated Counselor of
Embassy, Tokyo, and Consul General, Naha.28) He would serve there two years, a
period which was very difficult but also saw a great improvement in the atmosphere
thanks in no small part to his own efforts. As mentioned above, Deming, despite his
excellent reporting and apparent concern for the situation in Okinawa, would not be
involved with Okmawan affairs upon his return to Washington to the Bureau of African
Affairs.
D) Byron E. Blankinship (1959 1960; POLAD, 1960-1961)
Deming's successor, Blankinship, too had rich experience in Spanish and Latin
American affairs. Like Detning, he too was sent to Okinawa "just out of the blue,
without any real briefing."29' And finally, like Deming, he would have no responsibility
for Okinawan affairs upon his departure in August 1961 to become Consul General in
Amsterdam (beginning in 1962).
Blankmship was born on June 2, 1913 in Portland, Oregon and would live in the area
until he graduated in 1935 from Pacific University, a school established in the 1840s
west of Portland. Having majored in History, Blankinship developed an interest in inter-
national affairs and entered the University of California at Berkeley shortly thereafter.
In 1937, after earning his M. A., Blankinship moved to New York to enter the doctoral
program at Columbia University.
Having had a high regard for the Foreign Service, Blankinship joined血e State
Department in 1942 (wi也out obtaining his Ph. D.) , serving in Tijuana, Mexico, and then
from April 1944 to April 1947, in Madrid. From Spain, he was sent to Honduras in the
fall of 1947, where he served until 1952. In the summer of that year, Blankinship
attended the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, for one year and after return-
ing to the State Department in 1953, was assigned to South American affairs responsible
28) Deming Interview, FAOHP.
29) Author's interview with Byron E. Blankinship, July 2, 2000, Portland, Oregon (hereafter Blankinship interview).
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for Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. In 1956, he moved to the office of the Foreign
Service Inspection Corps where he continued until his assignment to Okinawa in the
summer of 1959 as Consul General.
The Consuls General and the Okinawa Problem
The issues making up the "Okinawa problem" were numerous, often overlapped, and
indeed were often intertwined. Namely these were the reversion issue, the military land
issue, the crisis in local democracy and self-rule, and finally the issue of the bases
themselves and base-related accidents, incidents, and crimes. While it is impossible here
to discuss all of the aspects and all of the responses taken by the Consuls General, a
brief look at their recommendations will prove instructive.
Early on, Murfin dealt mostly with the issues of reversion to Japan and democracy in
local politics. In one of Murfin's first reports, he noted that in the March 2, 1952 election
for the Ryukyu Legislature, the majority of仙e members elected had included in their
platforms advocation of early return to full Japanese sovereignty, thus suggesting that
it was an issue to be taken seriously.30'Importantly, Murfin also noted that the election
of pro-Communist Senaga Kamejiro to the assembly, while expected, over both a promi-
nent banker, who was President of the Chamber of Commerce, Goeku Choshu, and a
former governor, Taira Tatsuo, by large margins was "unexpected" and "considered
indicative sentiment discontented elements. "3 1 '
In these early years, as mentioned above, the military land problem was also emerg-
ing as an area of serious friction, and Murfin warned of "Okinawans Resenting Military
Encroachments" in a memorandum prepared on April 28, 1952.32) In particular, the
residents were protesting the fact that they were being asked to move to make room for
the second half of an 18-hole golf course. Interestingly, the area that Murfin reported on,
Higa-Shimabuku in the north, was血e same area that he had worked in during the
Naval Military Government, showing that he continued to maintain contact with the
residents there.
30) "Memorandum on Elections for Legislature of Ryukyuan Central Government (March 20, 1952) ," Central Dec-
imal File, 1950-1954 (794c.00/3-2052), Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State,
National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
31) "Telegram No. 2 (March 5, 1952)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794C.00/3-552), RG 59.
32) "Despatch No. 95, Recent Internal Political Developments in Okinawa (May 21, 1952) ," Central Decimal File,
1950-1954 (794C.00/5-2152), RG 59.
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Murfin's job did not get any easier. In April 1953, in the aftermath of the "Tengan Inci-
dent" in which USCAR officials disqualified a reformist candidate on questionable
charges after his victory, Murfin wrote:
It is apparent that, whatever the outcome, the prestige of the United States
administration will be impaired by the affair. The natural reaction of the
Ryukyuans is that United States Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands
(USCAR) should not have waited until the election was over and its favored
candidate was defeated, but should have disqualified Tengan [Choko] when he
was nominated, if at all. Interference after the election, whether or not
warranted, adds strength to the opposition parties'charges of "colonialism" and
lack of autonomy of Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), and, perhaps
equally serious, the investigation and airing of the circumstances of Tengan's
1946 conviction served to remind the people of the long period in which they
have been subject to the haphazard dispensation of justice itself by the provost
courts. The record of conviction itself contains undated and unsigned ink
changes-in one place showing the deletion of the word "not" before the word
"guilty", and in another discrepancies in dates, which the opposition parties
have seized and proclaimed as evidence that the record itself is questionable.33'
Embassy First Secretary Steeves, who received Murfin's dispatch, forwarded his
comments to the State Department, saying that the action "appears to have electrified
the already highly charged political atmosphere of Okinawa," a reference to, among
other things, the forced seizure of land in Aja and Mekaru villages on April ll for base
construction and expansion.34'
The issue of the military interfering in the local political scene would continue to
bother Murfin. In a letter to也e Embassy in May 1954, Murfin in his HSwan Song,"
expressed his concern over the military's proposal to remove from office "
communist legislators-"I fail to see how much would be gained…and I feel that much
more would be lost."35'Criticizing the military mentality which feels "that everyone
who is not wholeheartedly for us is per se against us," he continued by explaining that
HAt present we have at least the form of a democratic institution in the Legislature,
33) "Despatch No. ll, Ryukyus Legislative By-Elections Test Party Strength (April 13, 1953) ," Central Decimal
File, 1950-1954 (794C.00/4-1353) , RG 59.
34) "Despatch No. 2149, Okinawa By-Election Repercussions (April 16, 1953) ," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954
(794C.00/4-1653) , RG 59. In the follow-up elections, the opposition won.
35) "Letter from Murfin to Sam Berger (May 26, 1954), Enclosure to Letter from Murfin to Richard B, Finn
(May 26, 1954) ," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794c.00/5-2654), RG 59.
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wi也non-democratic and very definite final controls which probably are not generally
noted elsewhere. If we impair the democratic form itself, by deciding the any
representatives elected by the people may not participate, we have little left." For the
"the military actually to actually remove elected representatives from office is going
too far," Murfin warned, "if we are to pretend the semblance of a freely elected
Legislature. '
While a full purge of the Legislature itself did not take place after Murfin left in June
for Tokyo (and then the United States), Chairman of the Okinawa People's Party
{Okinawa Jinminto) Senaga was arrested in the fall for harboring a fugitive and was
thus removed from the Legislature. The crisis in democracy would continue. Steeves,
who arrived in early 1955 as Murfin's successor, would have his hands full.
In the spring of 1955, as Steeves was getting settled in, the military began its next
stage of forced land acquisitions on Ie Jima. Steeves warned the State Department that
"current plans for the acquisition of an additional 40,000 acres of land (roughly doubl-
ing current United States holdings) will result in further deterioration of Ryukyu-United
States relations" and that "a new plan calling for the establishment of a naval air facil-
lty will result in the displacement of 1 , 000 families from land previously turned back to
private owners."3
With the situation worsening due to the land problem and the overall dissatisfaction
of the local residents, Steeves called for a "revolutionary" overhaul, arguing that
"nothing short of a reorganization of the governmental institutions in these islands can
provide the solution to the problems which the United States faces in carrying out its
future responsibilities here. The deficiencies in the present system.‥cannot be rectified
by half measures or minor alterations."37' Indeed, Steeves'basic premise was that
"Military government cannot be a substitute for civil government over an extended
period m times of peace." His recommendation received the strong support of Ambassa-
dor John M. Allison in Tokyo.38'Allison arranged for Steeves to meet with Assistant
36) "Despatch No. 18, Conversation with Shinzato and Ohama (September 8, 1955) ," Central Decimal File, 1955-
1959 (794.00/9-855), RG 59.
37) "Despatch No. 18, Draft Proposal for New Government of the Ryukyu Islands (October 23, 1956) ," Folder 322.
3 Ryukyus, September-December 1956, Box 47, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Depart-
ment of State. For extensive recent coverage of this memo, see Yara Tomohiro, "Kaiheitai no Okinawa iju
Keikakuchushi o beisoryoji ga hatarakikake (U. S. Consul General Tries to Stop Plans for Marines to Reloc-
ate to Okinawa) ," Okinawa Taimusu, April 28, 2002.
38) "Letter from Allison to Walter Robertson (October 25, 1956) ," Folder 322.3 Ryukyus, September-December
1956, Box 47, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State.
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Secretary of State, Walter S. Robertson, when也e latter was in Tokyo in December that
year.
State Department dissatisfaction with the way the administration was run had been
brewing for several years. By 1956 however the momentum was moving toward changes
in the administration. Eventually, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive
Order 10713 in 1957, although也e amendments were far from perfect.
It was not only the State Department that was dissatisfied with the running of the
administration, but the Okinawans too. As was discussed above, voters in Naha elected
Senaga mayor of Naha City to fill血e vacancy when Toma Jugo became Chief Execu-
tive following Governor Higa Shuhei's sudden death. The inherent problems of U. S. POL
icy and the limits of democracy under military government had shown itself again.
Aware of this, Steeves, upon his return to Washington, drafted a long report on the situ-
ation m Okinawa. "We had a wonderful opportunity in Okinawa…but we muffed it,"
Steeves recalled when speaking of the report.39) "We could have made that island an
example, 'he said to the author, "that still would ricocheting around Asia now. But we
didnt do it." In Steeves'report, he warned仇at "the administration of Ryukyuan civil
affairs, if unwisely executed, could in the long run negate the very purposes of our mili-
tary mission" and that "our military interests could be endangered or placed in jeopardy
by growing discontent on the part of the populace."40'Steeves'recommendations would
be well received by the department and his views consistently consulted when he moved
on to the POLAD office at CINCPAC that summer.
It was in this very sensitive environment that Deming arrived. Deming was very much
aware that Okinawa had become a "cause-celebre" between Washington and
Toky0.41'In an effort to improve relations following the disenfranchisement of Senaga
and the subsequent election of leftist Kaneshi Saichi in early 1958, Deming held a party
for Kaneshi at the Consulate. Many in the military were leery of meeting with the
mayor, Deming recalled (half-laughingly) , warning that it was better "not to fraternize
with the enemy." In the author's interview with him Deming explained that
the war was still a hot memory [for the military]. So many of those in
39) Steeves interview.
40) "A Review of Our Ryukyuan Policy With Recommendations (March 14, 1957)," Folder: OCB 091. Japan (File
#7) [February-May 1957], Box 49, OCB Central File Series, White House Office, National Security Council
Staff Papers, 1948-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.
41) Deming interview.
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0kinawa had had physical involvement in the battle of Okinawa, had lost
friends or family. It was still a hot issue. They didn't like to make contact with
the Okinawans even…Practically no Okinawans came [to where the officers
lived] nor were they wanted. Some of the more junior officers had a more
mellow, a more sophisticated attitude.toward them. Some said, look we're here
for security reasons. Let's work together. Let's relax these restrictions, etc. But
it took a long time [for these views to prevail].
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, when he visited Okinawa in May 1957 shortly
after his arrival in Japan, observed this atmosphere and was extremely critical of the
military's attitude.42'He made a point of traveling only in the consular vehicle, Deming
recalled, saying that he did not want to go around Okinawa in the military's planes or
cars because "we ha[d] to keep a separation (between the military and the State
Department)." MacArthur warned也at "it was very easy to be `captive'of the military,
psychologically. You have to keep your independence."43'
By this poi鴫relations with Japan were indeed becoming endangered by the con-
tinued administration of Okinawa and in 1958 the White House and State Department
seriously began considering returning Okinawa. Indeed, it may have been Deming's
letter to the State Department of January 15, 1958 recommending that the U.S.
"military position be preserved through也e procedure of obtaining long term base rights,"
a plan considered by the State Department earlier in the decade, that became the impe-
tus for a major reevaluation of the U. S. position there including reversion.44)
In the meantime while this review was going on, Deming, and his right-hand man,
Ronald A. Gaiduk, sought to maintain good relations with the military and worked tire-
42) MacArthur wrote Secretary of State Dulles that Hour overall relations with Japan would be so adversely
affected by the Okinawa situation that仇ey will steadily deteriorate to the point where they jeopardize our
vital interests in this part, the relations not only with Japan but with other friendly Asian countries." See
"Letter from MacArthur to Secretary of State (February 1, 1958) ," Folder: Strictly ConfidentiaトM(l) , Box
3, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1952-1959, Eisenhower Library.
43) Deming interview. When reminded of MacArthur's letter to Dulles, Deming, obviously satisfied, said to the
author, "Good for him...His going to Okinawa in that visit probably strengthened his feeling about the
insensitivity (of the military) and the political difficulty of having and keeping good relations with a country
when you are occupying a piece of that country militarily."
44) "Memorandum from Deming to Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Parsons (January 15, 1958),"
Folder 322.3 Ryukyus, January-February 1958, Box 48, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the
Department of State. For more on this plan, see the author's 9-part series "40 Nenmae no Kichi Togo
Keikaku ni Manabu (Learning From the Base Consolidation Plan of 40 Years Ago) "Ryukyu Shimpo, January
19-February 1, 2001.
45) Interview with Mrs. Ronald A. Gaiduk, January 12, 2000, Washington, D. C.
46) Deming Interview, FAOHP.
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lessly at changing its attitudes.45'Nevertheless, Deming admitted that while he did not
find "the 'military mind'inscrutable, [it was] difficult to accommodate."4
Blankmsmp too sought necessarily to maintain, good relations with the military and
this was institutionalized by the creation of POLAD in 1960. At the same time, one
month prior to its establishment, Blankinship recommended that it was "essential to
present the new POLAD position to the public in a way that will not derogate posture of
the State Department as compared to the military. Unless this is accomplished,
Ryukyuan and other observers may interpret creation of POLAD as tightening of mili-
tary authority and depreciation of American civilian role in Okinawa."47'Alluding to
the problem of the test firing of Nike-Hercules missiles in November(1959) , Blankinship
added that "coming on the heels of recent agitation here, in Japan, and Red China
regarding Nike firings, any action that could be interpreted as reduction in status of
Consular Unit may be seen here as ominous indication of further military domination."
Ironically, it seems, Blankinship's foreboding would prove correct- despite the fact that
the number of State Department personnel slightly increased with the existence of both
the POLAD office and the continuation of the Consulate, reporting on the local situation
and influence there decreased in the first half of the 1960s because of the HiCom's
efforts to maintain the status quo with regard to the administration of the islands and his
lack of consultation with either POLAD or the Consul General (who subsequently
became Consul).
Conclusions
Wi山地e State Department institutionally excluded from occupation/administration
policy for Okinawa, and the Consul General in a unique, trying, and disadvantaged
position, unable to decide or directly influence policy, it may be difficult to accurately
evaluate his role there. Nevertheless, as the above study suggests, the State
Departments representative in Naha was a moderating influence on policy con-
siderations, with his recommendations being read and acted on (in many, but of course,
not all situations) by those in policy-making circles in the State Department who
sought to confront and challenge the Defense Department regarding not only the
47) "Telegram No. 159 from Naha to Secretary of State (December 3, 1959)," Central Decimal File, 1955-1959
(794C.0221/12-359) , RG 59
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administration, but the rationale behind the administration itself.
It would not be until 1972 before Okinawa-was returned to Japan. The United States
was lucky that the poorly run administration of Okinawa did not further blow up into
an irreparable bilateral issue with Japan, embittering both the people of Okinawa and
the rest oHapan in the process, and embarrassing U. S. prestige abroad. The presence
of the Consul General, who was able to independently observe the situation there and
report to his superiors in Tokyo and Washington through independent communication
channels, was vital in this regard, acting to point out early on problem areas and to rec-
ommend improvements, as well as to work with his Japanese counterparts (a subject
not taken up here). Likewise, while carefully maintaining good relations with the
military, as well as with the local population, the Consul General was able to act as a
moderating influence both toward the military and the often-agitated residents and their
representa tives.
Having a high quality staff, bo仇Iocal and American, aided the work of the Consul
General tremendously, who in some cases had little experience with politico-military or
Okinawan-related affairs prior to their assignment. Moreover, the interest in仇e situa-
tion m Okinawa demonstrated by both the Tokyo Embassy and the State Department in
Washington, as symbolized by the frequent exchange of letters (in addition to
telegrams) and visits (Ambassador Murphy in 1952, Ambassador MacArthur in May
1957 and March 1959, Undersecretary Christian A. Herter in August 1957, as well as
numerous others) was an important factor in the quality of the work of the Consuls
General. Unfortunately, rather than tapping into the knowledge gained by the Consuls
General during his time in Okinawa, the State Department assigned each Consul Gen-
eral (with the exception of Steeves) to areas and other divisions for the most part
unrelated to Okinawa.
Nevertheless, while their work was no doubt difficult, all of the Consuls General
remember fondly the people of Okinawa (and the liking is mutualトperhaps the best
testimony of the bridge that the Consulate served during this trying time.
